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Abstract
The direct evolutionary approach according to Leininger (2003) states that players in a 
two player Tullock rent-seeking contest within a ﬁ  nite population behave „as if“ they 
were relative payoﬀ   maximizers. Accordingly contest expenditures are higher than in 
Nash equilibrium. The indirect evolutionary approach also predicts more aggressive 
behavior by the players since negatively interdependent preferences are evolutionary 
stable. Both players are willing to harm themselves in material terms just to harm 
their opponent even more. I consider that every player in the contest has to contract 
a delegate either using a relative contract or a no-win-nopay contract. I show that 
delegation once introduced is able to overcompensate all negative eﬀ  ects of negatively 
interdependent objective functions. But as in the case without delegation a commitment 
on more aggressive behavior is a dominant strategy. Nevertheless delegation endows 
principals with a material payoﬀ   that is equal to the payoﬀ   an individualistic player 
facing another individualistic player would get.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: C72, D72, M52
Keywords: Contest; strategic delegation; spite; agency theory
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Contests are omnipresent in nature, including human live. Everywhere individuals are
investing irreversible eﬀorts in order to have the chance of winning a price. R&D races or
the ﬁght between two animals for a piece of food are only two examples. Many articles
have been written concerning contests, for an overview see Congleton et. al (2008) and
Lockard and Tullock (2001).
In the last years, there has also been an increasing interest into evolutionary perspec-
tives on contests. The idea is that those individuals which are more successful have more
resources to raise oﬀspring and therefore become more frequent in the population. One
of the ﬁrst authors using an evolutionary approach in an economic context was Alchian
(1950). It took another 24 years before the term Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) was
introduced into the literature by Maynard Smith (1974). Smith used a pair-wise contest
in an inﬁnite population. In 1988 Schaﬀer generalized this concept to cover the case of a
ﬁnite population and more than two contestants. Schaﬀer called his solution concept gen-
eralized ESS. Since then many authors were concerned with determining an evolutionary
stable behavior, for example Leininger (2003) and Hehenkamp et. al (2004). An impor-
tant result of these authors is that spiteful behavior yields an evolutionary advantage in
contests. That means that individuals are willing to hurt themselves if the opponents
suﬀer even more. By decreasing the payoﬀs of the opponents even more than one’s own
payoﬀ, an individual can be relatively more successful and therefore raise more oﬀspring
compared to other individuals. Also, full- and even overdissipation of the rent can occur
(see Hehenkamp et. al, 2004).
G¨ uth and Yaari (1992) pioneered the examination of the evolution of preferences and
how behavior may be aﬀected. They called this an indirect evolutionary approach. Be-
havior is determined by the preferences of the individual. Only the preference that makes
an individual choose appropriate strategies will survive. This means that individuals
can not choose their strategy to be relatively more successful as in the direct evolution-
4ary approach but nature chooses the preferences that indirectly determine the behavior
in equilibrium. Leininger (2009) showed that in ﬁnite populations individualistic payoﬀ
maximization is not evolutionary stable. In fact only negatively interdependent prefer-
ences survive in a ﬁnite population. Additionally Leininger (2009) showed that the direct
and indirect evolutionary approach are equivalent in terms of the behavior generated in
equilibrium for two player contests. But this development elicits spiteful behavior of the
players. In an evolutionarily stable equilibrium every player invests more and has a lower
expected return than without other-regarding preferences. Maximizing relative payoﬀs is
a commitment device at the level of preferences that evolves evolutionarily and causes too
much eﬀort compared to absolute payoﬀ maximizing behavior.
Maynard Smith (1974) assigned ESS-behavior only to animals, an assumption that is
implicitly made in the literature. The question that I address here is: Is there a mecha-
nism in human society that mitigates spiteful behavior even in the presence of ”spiteful”,
i.e. negatively interdependent preferences? The answer being positive, I will show that
strategic delegation is able to mitigate spiteful behavior and to make contestants better
oﬀ compared to absolute payoﬀ maximization. Nevertheless using contracts with higher
incentives for the delegate act as a similar commitment device used by the players since
this ensures more aggressive behavior by the agent which still is advantageous in the con-
test. By choosing such contracts material payoﬀs for the principals fall but delegation is
still able to oﬀset the negative eﬀects of other-regarding preferences.
The idea of strategic delegation goes back to Schelling (1960). He pointed out that delega-
tion can serve as a commitment device and can be beneﬁcial for the delegating principal.
Many economists have been concerned with delegation since Schelling, for example Fer-
shtman and Judd (1987), Katz (1991), Fershtman and Kalai (1997) and Baik (2007).
W¨ arneryd (2000) showed that delegation by all principals is preferred to competing on
one’s own behalf by individualistic payoﬀ maximizing principals. The reason is that the
prize has to be shared between the principal and her agent, in case of victory. So the
incentive for an agent is always lower than for the principal and therefore eﬀorts fall, with
5expected payoﬀs rising.
In order to show the beneﬁts of delegation I use the evolutionary stable negatively
interdependent preferences for two player contests identiﬁed by Leininger (2009). Two
players out of an arbitrary population will compete for a single indivisible prize and they
are obliged to hire a delegate who has to compete for them. I use the well-known Tullock
Contest-Success-Function (CSF) to determine the winner. The contest has three stages.
At the ﬁrst stage the principals choose the contracts they want to use simultaneously.
Subsequently they contract a delegate and they announce the terms of the contract to
the other principals and to both delegates truthfully. At the third stage the actual con-
test between the delegates takes place. A principal has the choice between two kinds
of contracts. The ﬁrst one oﬀers a share of the prize to incentivize the delegate. Such
contracts were used before in the literature, for example by Baik and Kim (1997) or Baik
(2007). The second type consists of a payment that is made conditional on the rela-
tive success of the agent in the contest. Both delegates are not involved in the conﬂict
before they are contracted and maximize their individualistic payoﬀ. I will show that
both contracts make the principals at least as successful as players that maximize their
absolute payoﬀ in a setting without delegation. If the agent is paid according to relative
success, the principal has to pay a ﬁxum to hire an agent. But a prisoners’ dilemma-like
game-structure will prevent moral hazard in the relationship between agent and principal.
The paper is organized as follows. First of all I will recall the equilibrium outcomes
without delegation within a population of absolute and relative payoﬀ maximizing players
as a benchmark in Section 2. In Section 3 I will set up the model with both kinds of
contracts. The contract choice game is solved in Section 4 before section 5 concludes.
2 Rent-seeking without delegation
This paper examines Tullock’s (1980) contests with two opponents within a population
of 𝑁 individuals, with 2 ≤ 𝑁<∞. Both opponents invest irreversible eﬀort to win the
6indivisible prize 𝑉 . The valuation is the same for both. Since no delegation takes place
we have only one stage. The winner is determined using the common Tullock Contest-
Success-Function (CSF) with 𝑟 = 1 (constant marginal eﬃciency of eﬀort as Guse and
Hehenkamp, 2006, called it). Accordingly the probability of player 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈{ 1,2}, winning






𝑥𝑖+𝑥−𝑖 for 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥−𝑖 > 0
1
2 for 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥−𝑖 =0 .
2.1 Absolute payoﬀ maximizing
Every principal strikes for her own beneﬁt, independently of population size and outcomes










(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥−𝑖)2𝑉 − 1
! =0 .
In equilibrium we get
𝑥1 = 𝑥2 =
𝑉
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Nevertheless absolute payoﬀ maximizing is not evolutionary stable as is shown in the
following subsection.
72.2 Relative payoﬀ maximizing principals
To show why it is beneﬁcial for individuals to act as if they were relative payoﬀ maximizers
in the direct evolutionary I refer to Schaﬀer (1988). Two players out of an arbitrary
population of size 𝑁 are drawn into contest. 𝑁 − 1 players are playing the evolutionary
stable strategy 𝑥𝐸𝑆𝑆 and one single player (a mutant) is playing a diﬀerent strategy 𝑥𝑀.
Therefore with probability 1
𝑁−1 an ESS-player meets the mutant in the contest.
The corresponding payoﬀ for the mutant is
𝜋𝑀 =
𝑥𝑀
𝑥𝑀 + 𝑥𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑉 − 𝑥
𝑀.

























As Schaﬀer (1988) points out the equilibrium condition for 𝑥𝐸𝑆𝑆 being an evolutionary
stable strategy is
𝜋𝑀 ≤ 𝜋𝐸𝑆𝑆 , for any strategy 𝑥
𝑀.
If the mutant is chosen to participate in the conﬂict she has to solve the following problem
max

















The solution of the given problem is 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑥𝐸𝑆𝑆 and the corresponding maximum is zero.
The stability condition used by Schaﬀer (1988) is omitted here because of simplicity.
In contrast to an absolute payoﬀ maximizer both players act as if they were concerned with
a weighted relative payoﬀ in an evolutionary stable equilibrium. This weighted relative
payoﬀ is identical to their relative payoﬀs if 𝑁 = 2. In an evolutionary context absolute
8payoﬀ is not the main criterion to measure the ﬁtness of an individual. Relative payoﬀ
is important because an individual wants to raise more oﬀspring than the opponents and
not just more oﬀspring. This gives way for the development of spiteful behavior. An
individual hurts herself just to hurt the opponent even more, a point already mentioned
by Hamilton (1970). This behavior at the level of strategies in the direct evolutionary
approach can be shown to be reproduced at the level of preferences in the indirect evo-
lutionary approach (see Leininger, 2009). If players are direct payoﬀ maximizers, they
are driven to maximize nagatively interdependent preferences in the evolutionarily stable
preferences.
Accordingly, the utility function of an arbitrary player 𝑗, 𝑗 ∈{ 1,2},i sn o wg i v e nb y













By deriving the ﬁrst order conditions we get






Since the winning probability is 1









Note that we have full dissipation if 𝑁 = 2 as both players then maximize relative payoﬀs.
But for 𝑁 approaching inﬁnity the evolutionarily stable utility function converges to the
individualistic payoﬀ function. As 𝑁 increases the concern for the payoﬀs of the other
9players gets smaller and smaller, because only one rival can be hurt and 𝑁 − 2 players
remain unaﬀected by the contest. Accordingly, as can be seen from the above formulas
𝑢𝑅 = 𝜋𝑅 = 𝜋 from section 2.1 for 𝑁 approaching inﬁnity. But for smaller 𝑁𝜋 > 𝜋 𝑅.
Suppose that we have a population of individualistic players as starting point. Due to
mutations an other-regarding player occurs. The mutant acts more aggressively and as
a consequence hurts her opponent acting individualistic more than she hurts herself in
material terms. Accordingly she has a higher material payoﬀ and is more successful in
evolutionary terms compared to her opponent. In the end the whole population is made
up of other-regarding players because the mutation mentioned above has more resources
to spent and is therefore supposed to be more successful in reproducing herself. According
to that development the invested eﬀorts grow but since we are in a symmetric situation
the winning probability remains unchanged and therefore the material payoﬀs fall com-
pared to the situation before the mutation occured.
3 The Model
Now I turn towards contests with mandatory delegation. Both principals have negative
interdependent preferences. It is worth mentioning that this also ensures participation by
the principals: The individuals experience negative utility if they do not invest, since the
opponent wins for sure. The game has three stages. At the ﬁrst stage both principals
choose a contract each simultaneously. At stage II the principals contract a delegate.
The contract is announced to the other principal truthfully. Subsequently at stage III
both delegates engage in the contest and exert eﬀort. Finally the winner is determined
and the prize is handed out. Both principals can choose between two types of contracts:
No-win-no-pay contracts and relative contracts.
First of all, I examine the model with both principals using no-win-no-pay contracts. The
delegate obtains a part of the prize but only in case of victory. Thereafter the model
is deﬁned with a payment to delegates according to the relative success of the delegate.
The idea behind that contract is that the other-regarding preferences of a principal might
10induce ”other-regarding” contracts with the corresponding delegate. Subsequently I ex-
amine the asymmetric case, namely one principal using a no-win-no-pay contract and the
other one is rewarding her agent according to relative success.
In all cases the eﬀorts invested by a delegate are denoted by 𝑑. A subsript indicates the
principal the delegate is working for. A superscript refers to the case under examination.
3.1 No-win-no-pay contracts
Baik (2007) showed that it is optimal to use no-win-no-pay contracts for absolute payoﬀ
maximizing principals if they have to hire a delegate. Only if the contest is won, the
agent will get a share of the contested prize. I will denote the share principal 𝑙 is using
as an incentive by 𝗼𝑙,w i t h𝗼𝑙 ∈ [0,1] and 𝑙 ∈{ 1,2}. I exclude the possibility of reselling
the right to participate to another agent. If the right is sold, no delegation would take
place, just the principal is changed. I also exclude negative amounts as a ﬁxed part of
compensation because a ﬁxed payment does not change the behavior of the delegate and
therefore the equilibrium strategies. I will also show that delegation with no-win-no-
pay contracts is beneﬁcial for a principal even without a negative ﬁxed payment for the
delegate.




















The ﬁrst term stands for the material payoﬀ the principal gets. She does not have to
bear any eﬀort cost directly. On account of this she gets only the remaining share of the
contested prize. The second term reﬂects the principal’s concern for her relative position.
It is the material payoﬀ of her opponent weighted with 1
𝑁−1. Note that the opponent
principal also has to choose an agent.












11The reservation wage of the delegate is normalized to zero, but as long as the expected
payoﬀ for the delegate is negative, no rational agent will sign this contract. We solve the
model by backward induction, starting with stage III. For determining the optimal eﬀort,





















2 )2𝗼2𝑉 − 1
! =0 .
Solving these equations for 𝑑𝐴
1 and 𝑑𝐴




















I continue with analyzing the second stage. A principal chooses the oﬀered share 𝗼𝑙 such



















Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, let 𝗼1 = 𝗼2 = 𝗼. The ﬁrst order condition of any












12𝗼 = 0 is omitted here as a solution. The chosen 𝗼 of an other-regarding player is 1
2 for 𝑁 =
2 and converges to 1
3 for 𝑁 converging to inﬁnity. An absolute payoﬀ maximizing player in
an inﬁnite population would use one third of the contested prize to incentivize her delegate.
Therefore we can state that an other-regarding player will incentivize her delegate more
heavily than an absolute payoﬀ regarding principal and therefore acts spiteful if the contest
is played in a ﬁnite population.
We have established:
































The material payoﬀ of both principals is positive for any value of 𝑁, though they
experience zero utility for 𝑁 =2 .
Note that 𝜋𝐴
𝑃 >𝜋 𝑅 and 𝜋𝐴
𝑃 >𝜋for 𝑁>2 therefore delegation is beneﬁcial for the princi-
pals in material terms because the winning probability remains unchanged since we are in
a symmetric equilibrium and the expenditures in the contest are reduced. By introducing
delegation with no-win-no-pay contracts the prize has to be splitted up between agent
and principal. Accordingly the incentives for a delegate to exert eﬀort and for a principal
to stimulate the agent are always lower than without delegation. Also exerting eﬀort
13becomes more expensive because the principal has to pay the delegate to invest more but
only a fraction of this extra incentive is also expended. The reason for that is that the
expected payoﬀ for a delegate is non-negative because 𝗼 is assumed to be non-negative.
This result is in line with Baik (2007) who predicted positive proﬁts in the ”delegate
industry” for contests between absolute payoﬀ maximizing principals. As in the article
by Baik positive proﬁts are due to strategic decisions by the principals. The principals
try to put their agents into a similar situation they would be in without delegation. This
is achieved by using 𝗼𝑉 as prize in a new contest played by the delegates. According
to Section 2.1 the absolut payoﬀ maximizing behavior of the delegates leads to positiv
proﬁts for them.
3.2 Relative contracts
We now turn towards the case of relative contracts. Both principals pay their agent
depending on their relative success in the conﬂict. Let 𝗽𝑙,w i t h𝗽𝑙 ≥ 0a n d𝑙 ∈{ 1,2},
multiplied with the relative success as measured by the diﬀerence in winning probabilities
of agent 𝑙 represent the delegate’s payment.
That means if any delegate succeeds in achieving a higher winning probability than
the other delegate by using her eﬀort then she will be considered to be more successful and
therefore be rewarded. Note that a delegate will be punished if her opponent outperforms
her.
It is forbidden to sell the right of participation again, but it is possible to pay a ﬁxed
amount 𝐹 to the delegate to meet her participation constraint. That means an agent
gets a ﬁxed amount even if the contest is lost and a relative payment (which may be
negative) but has to pay her invested eﬀort. A principal has to pay the ﬁxed amount and
the relative payment but she earns the contested prize if her agent is successful.
Again, beginning with the analysis of stage III, we have to determine the equilibrium






















By deriving both delegate’s ﬁrst order condition and by setting them equal, we get
𝑑
𝐵
1 𝗽2 = 𝑑
𝐵
2 𝗽1.













































As before the payoﬀ function of the principal consists of the own material payoﬀ and
the material payoﬀ of the opponent weighted with the remaining share of the population
this opponent represents. The material payoﬀ is comprised of the ﬁxed and the relative
payment to the delegate as well as the contested prize if the contest is won.






(𝗽1 + 𝗽2)2𝑉 −
2𝗽1(𝗽1 + 𝗽2) − 𝗽2
1
(𝗽1 + 𝗽2)2 𝑉
+
𝗽2(𝗽1 + 𝗽2) − 𝗽1𝗽2










(𝗽1 + 𝗽2)2𝑉 −
1
(𝑁 − 1)
𝗽2(𝗽1 + 𝗽2) − 𝗽2𝗽1
(𝗽1 + 𝗽2)2 𝑉
! =0 .






Ih a v eo m i t t e d𝗽∗ = 0. In equilibrium both principals oﬀer their delegate one half of the
prize weighted with the diﬀerence in the winning probability they achieved as compensa-
tion. Notice that, since we are in a symmetric equilibrium, the relative payment to the
agent is zero because no delegate is more successful than the other one. Her payoﬀ would
be negative and no rational agent would ever sign this contract without a ﬁxed amount
as compensation. Therefore the ﬁxed amount is used to meet the participation constraint
of an agent. The only meaningful amount is 𝐹 = 𝑑. That means the principal pays the
equilibrium eﬀort. But why should a delegate invest something when the ﬁxed amount is
paid anyway? This problem is solved by a kind of prisoners’ dilemma that both agents
are in. Suppose that both do not invest any eﬀort. They will get their compensation




But what happens if the agent of player 𝑙 deviates and invests an inﬁnitively small, positive
amount 𝜀 and the other one invests nothing? The deviating agent would not only get the
ﬁxed payment but also a relative payment because she is more successful than the ”lazy”





and the other agent would lose! This amount is strictly larger than 𝐹. Therefore we
can see that an agent wants to deviate by investing eﬀort. In contrast to no-win-no-pay
contracts both agents earn a material payoﬀ of zero in equilibrium.
We have seen that a principal pays indirectly for the eﬀort. She oﬀers a contract and
raises the ﬁxed amount until an agent’s participation contraint is met. By using relative
contracts in a contest with two players out of a population of 𝑁 where the players have
16to delegate, we get



























𝑃 for 𝑁>2a n d𝜋𝐵
𝑃 = 𝜋𝐴
𝑃 for 𝑁 = 2. What makes the result more
striking is that I excluded negative ﬁxed payments in the no-win-no-pay contract case.
Therefore we face positive proﬁts there. But in the case with relative contracts I assumed
that the ﬁxed payment is only used to endow the delegate with zero utility.
Due to the introduction of relative contracts the eﬀects of delegation with no-win-no-
pay contracts are partly reversed and any principal as well as her corresponding delegate
act more aggressively. The reason for that is that the only way for a delegate to get a
positive proﬁt is to get ahead of the other delegate. Hence any agent is incentivized to
invest more eﬀort. This is analogue to the situation the principals are in since they are
also concerned with maximizing relative payoﬀs which makes them more aggressive. But
since 𝗽∗ = 1
2 the prize for the delegate is smaller than for a principal and accordingly she
acts not as aggressively as a principal would do in a situation without delegation. Thus
delegation with relative contracts is beneﬁcial compared to a situation without delegation.
173.3 Asymmetric case
In this case one principal is using a no-win-no-pay contract and the other one rewards her
delegate according to the relative success her agent achieves. Without loss of generality
I assume that principal 1 uses a no-win-no-pay contract and principal 2 uses a relative
contract. Let 𝗼 ∈ [0,1] denote the share of the contested prize that principal 1 oﬀers her
agent. And let 𝗽 ≥ 0 be the corresponding factor the second principal uses. 𝐹 𝐶 is the
ﬁxed payment used by the second principal.






























































Using this ﬁrst order condition to compute the reaction function of principal 1 yields
𝗼 = −2𝗽 +
√
4𝗽2(𝑁 − 2) + 2𝗽𝑁
(𝑁 − 1)
. (1)
18Since 𝗼 ∈ [0,1], I excluded −2𝗽 −
√
4𝗽2(𝑁−2)+2𝗽𝑁
(𝑁−1) as a solution.






(𝑁 − 2)𝗼2 + 𝗼𝑁
(𝑁 − 1)
. (2)
Apparently 𝗼 = 𝗽 = 0 is an intersection point of both reaction curves but with mandatory
delegation this is not an equilibrium since both principals have an incentive to deviate.
It is rather diﬃcult to ﬁnd the equilibrium analytically. But for my further analysis it is
not necessary to know the exact answer. It is possible to state the following:
Lemma 3: The principal using a no-win-no-pay contract will choose an 𝗼 ≤ 1
2 in
equilibrium if she has to deal with a principal using a relative contract, whatever value 𝗽
and 𝑁 are.
Proof: To show that the highest 𝗼 a rational principal chooses in the described
situation is smaller or equal than 1




≥ 𝗼 = −2𝗽 +
√
4𝗽2(𝑁 − 2) + 2𝗽𝑁
(𝑁 − 1)
.






2(𝑁 − 2) + 2𝗽𝑁.








For 𝑁 ≥ 3 the left side is greater since 𝗽>0. In contrast for 𝑁 = 2 both sides are equal
19if 𝗽 =0 ,25 but for any other value of 𝗽 the left side is greater. Therefore we can state
that the inequality holds true, whatever value 𝗽 and 𝑁 are.
■
















Using the reaction functions just derived above, we can show
Lemma 4: Principal 2 does not have to use a ﬁxed payment to attract a delegate and
therefore 𝐹 𝐶 =0 .
Proof: Principal 2 does not have to pay a ﬁxed amount if the payoﬀ for her agent is











2𝑁 + ((1 +
√
2)






2)2 − 4)𝗼>0 we can omit it for the moment to concentrate on




This is true for 𝗼 ≤ 2
1+2
√
2. Lemma 3 showes that this condition is satsﬁed. Therefore the
20expected payoﬀ for the delegate is positive.
■
The incentives for the delegate of principal 2 due to the relative contract are so strong
that her invested eﬀort is high enough to make the according relative payment suﬃcient
to pay for her eﬀort. If player 1 wants to incentivize her delegate in a similar way she
would have to oﬀer more than 2
1+2
√
2𝑉 as a prize for the delegate, which is ruled out by
her reaction function.
4 Equilibrium in the contract choice game










Where NW stands for no-win-no-pay contracts and RC for relative contracts.
In o ws h o wt h a t
Theorem 1: If two players out of a population consisting of 2 ≤ 𝑁<∞ individuals with
negatively interdependent preferences are drawn into a contest with mandatory delegation
the unique Nash Equilibrium is given by (RC, RC).
Proof: It has to be shown that using a relative contract is the dominant strategy. There-
fore the following must hold
(i) 𝑢𝐶
𝑃2 >𝑢 𝐴 and
(ii) 𝑢𝐵 >𝑢 𝐶
𝑃1.
























(𝑁 − 2)𝗼2 + 𝗼𝑁
(𝑁 − 1)
)(
2+2 𝗼 − 2
√
(𝑁 − 2)𝗼2 + 𝗼𝑁
(𝑁 − 1)
)
> (𝑁 − 1)(𝑁 − 2)2
√
(𝑁 − 2)𝗼2 + 𝗼𝑁
(𝑁 − 1)
+( 3 𝑁 − 2)(𝗼 − 𝗼
2).
Which can be rewritten as
√
(𝑁 − 2)𝗼2 + 𝗼𝑁
(𝑁 − 1)
















After doing some rearrangement we get
16𝑁
3 +8 1 𝗼
2𝑁
2 +1 2 𝗼𝑁 +3 6 𝗼
2 > 108𝗼
2𝑁 +9 𝗼𝑁
3 +1 2 𝗼𝑁
2 +1 6 𝑁
2.
To show that the left hand side is greater than the right hand side I will deﬁne the
function 𝑓 : R ∈ [0; 1








2 +1 2 𝗼𝑁 − 108𝗼
2𝑁 +3 6 𝗼
2.
Of course this function is continously and twice diﬀerentiable.
As long as this function is greater than zero the condition mentioned above is full-
ﬁlled. We can see that 𝑓 is indeed greater than zero for any 𝗼 ∈ [0; 1
2]i f𝑁 =2a n d
if 𝑁 →∞ .A tﬁ r s tg l a n c ei ti sn o tc l e a rw h a th a p p e n si nb e t w e e n .O nt h a ta c c o u n t






2𝑁 − 32𝑁 − 24𝗼𝑁 +1 2 𝗼 − 108𝗼
2.
If the ﬁrst derivative is positive than also 𝑓 is positive. Since we are starting at a
positive value and the function is increasing.
22Obviously the ﬁrst derivative is also positive for 𝑁 =2a n d𝑁 →∞for any
𝗼 ∈ [0; 1




=9 6 𝑁 − 54𝗼𝑁 + 162𝗼
2 − 32 − 24𝗼.
For any value of 𝗼 ∈ [0; 1
2] the second derivative is positive if 𝑁 ≥ 0. That means
the ﬁrst derivative is an increasing function in the domain and it also starts at a
positive value.
Using the same argument for 𝑓 we can conclude that the diﬀerence is positive.
(ii) For any principal it has to be beneﬁcial to react with a relative contract to an





















2𝑁 +2 𝗼 +4 𝗽 +4 𝗼𝗽 > 3𝗼𝑁 +4 𝗼
2 +8 𝗽
2.
Since 2𝗼 ≥ 4𝗼2 as shown by lemma 3 it will be omitted for the moment.
To ease my further analysis I split the problem. If each term on the left side is
greater or equal than the corresponding term on the right side and one term is
strictly greater then the sum of the left side will also be greater.
We get
∙ 4𝗽 +4 𝗼𝗽 ≥ 8𝗽2 and
∙ 2𝗽𝑁 +4 𝗼2𝑁>3𝗼𝑁.
We can see that both conditions are fullﬁlled for 𝑁 ≥ 2i fw er e c a l lt h a t0<𝗼≤ 1
2
and if we use (2) to substitute 𝗽.
■
23Now that the equilibrium in the contract choice game has been revealed I turn to-
wards the respective material payoﬀs. Assuming that no delegation has been introduced,
a player would receive a material payoﬀ of 𝜋 = 𝑉
4 if she were in a world of absolute payoﬀ
maximizers. In contrast to 𝜋𝑅 = 𝑁−2
4(𝑁−1)𝑉 if there were only relative payoﬀ maximizers.
Maximizing weighted relative payoﬀ is evolutionary stable as shown by Leininger (2009).
For comparison I refer to the ﬁrst case. The reason for that is that I want to point out
that delegation is able to oﬀset all negative eﬀects of other-regarding preferences. That
means I will show that delegation is able to endow the principals with as much material
payoﬀ as simple payoﬀ maximization by all players would do.






Delegation is introduced, now. The unique equilibrium is given by both principals




We can immediately state:
Theorem 2: Two randomly chosen players out of a population of absolute payoﬀ
maximizing players of arbitrary size drawn to play the described contest earn the same
material payoﬀ in equilibrium as two randomly chosen players out of a population of
other-regarding players of arbitrary size that are chosen to play a corresponding contest
by contracting delegates both using relative contracts.
■
This is also true for two player contests with 𝑟 ≤ 1 and for contests between more than 2
principals and 𝑟 = 1. The latter case is shown in the appendix. The ﬁrst one is straight-
24forward and therefore omitted.
By using a relative contract a principal is able to establish a situation with independent
payoﬀ maximizing individuals engaging in a contest. The reason for this is the symmetry
of the opponents. Symmetry cancels out the relative payment for the delegates. Therefore












We have seen that a principal pays the eﬀort indirectly, i.e. 𝐹 𝐵
𝑙 = 𝑑𝐵
𝑙 . All that remains
is the well known payoﬀ function for a contest of absolute payoﬀ maximizing players Tul-
lock (1980) used. The only diﬀerence is that the eﬀorts are exerted by the delegates. The
material payoﬀ for any delegate is zero because no principal is willing to pay more in
equilibrium since this is the lowest value for which the participation constraint is met.
We have seen in Section 3.2 that no-win-no-pay contracts yield a higher monetary
payoﬀ, if 𝑁 ≥ 2 compared to absolute payoﬀ maximizing behavior without delegation
and delegation with relative contracts. By the introduction of delegation with no-win-no-
pay contracts the negative eﬀects of maximizing relative payoﬀs is completely internalized
and even overcompensated for populations with more than two individuals.
Accordingly both principals would prefer a situation without relative contracts. But in the
manner of interdependent preferences in contests without delegation also interdependent
contracts in contests with delegation have a strategic advantage as we have seen in 3.3.
Once relative contracts are introduced or have developed it is the dominant strategy
for both principals to use them. By using this kind of contracts the delegates can be
incentivised more heavily and therefore they act more aggressively which gives them an
advantage compared to less incentivised opponents. This behavior can also be called
spiteful. Brieﬂy speaking principals are in a prisoners’ dilemma. Nevertheless they have a
higher absolute payoﬀ than without delegation. In fact the spiteful behavior according to
the maximization of relative payoﬀs is completely internalized and principals are endowed
25with the same material payoﬀ an individualistic player would get if she had to play the
contest against another individualistic player.
5 Conclusion
The question I tried to answer was: Are there mechanisms to reduce competition and
therefore wasteful investments in rent-seeking-contests when preferences are spiteful?
To this end this paper explored the eﬀects of delegation in a Tullock rent-seeking contest
when players maximize weighted relative payoﬀ. In a population of individualistic players
a certain type of other-regarding player has an advantage. She acts more aggressively
and therefore harms the opponent in material terms even more than she hurts herself in
the direct contest and also obtains higher material payoﬀ than other individuals in the
population. Accordingly being also an other-regarding player is beneﬁcial in evolutionary
terms. Through natural selection weighted relative payoﬀ maximizing players become
more frequent and in the end the whole population is made up by such players. But
this is spiteful because maximizing the relative position in the population leads to higher
eﬀorts and reduces the material outcome for every player.
It is shown that in this situation delegation makes the players better oﬀ in a two
player Tullock contest. I assume that the contest is played within an arbitrary popula-
tion. By prescribed delegation every player can do at least as well as if she were in a
population of payoﬀ maximizing players only. I.e. the evolutionarily imposed ”spiteful”
preferences get ”neutralized” in the contract game. No-win-no-pay contracts are even able
to overcompensate the negative eﬀects of relative payoﬀ maximizing behavior. But since
interdependent preferences yield an advantage in rent-seeking contests with contracts that
reward the delegate according to her relative success, those develop and are used by the
principals. This reduces the eﬃciency gained by the introduction of delegation with no-
win-no-pay contracts. However, compared to a population of individualistic players the
eﬃciency is completely restored. In essence, the economic institution of contracting del-
egates can completely oﬀset the ineﬃciency caused by natural evolutionary forces at the
26preference level, which drive players to hold ”spiteful” preferences. In theory, delegation
could do even better, but is held back by the same competitive evolutionary forces at the
contracting level. More aggressive contracts drive out more moderate ones.
It is shown that there exists a ﬁxed amount the principal has to pay to hire a delegate in
the equilibrium of the contract choice game. The ﬁxed amount does not alter the invested
eﬀort but is necessary to make an agent willing to sign a contract. A game-structure like
in a prisoners’ dilemma prevents the delegate from acting as a free-rider.
Mandatory delegation has been assumed. The consequences of relative payoﬀ max-
imizing players on the terms of contract have been shown. But it is interesting to ask
whether prescribed delegation leads to changes in evolutionary stable strategies and pref-
erences. Of importance is also the question after evolutionary stable preferences within
contests between more than two opponents.
6 Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium with 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁 participants and 𝑟 =1
If 2 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁 absolute payoﬀ maximizing players play the contest the material payoﬀ
according to Tullock (1980) is
𝑉
𝑛2.
Now, let 𝑛 players out of an arbitrary population of 𝑁 individuals with other-regarding
preferences play the contest again. All have to hire a delegate that competes for them.
In order to solve the game, I consider two kinds of principals. One of type 𝑠 and 𝑛−1o f
type 𝑡. This can be interpreted as only one player deviating from the equilibrium strategy.
Each principal of type 𝑡 only maximizes her utility. The eﬀort of a principal’s delegate
is denoted by 𝑑𝑠 i fs h ei sa n𝑠-player or 𝑑𝑡 i fs h ei sa𝑡 player. ˆ 𝑑𝑡 or ˆ 𝗼𝑡 indicate that we
examine a representative principal of type 𝑡.
276.1.1 No-win-no-pay contracts
If all players use no-win-no-pay contracts, then the utility function of an arbitrary principal
of type 𝑡 is
𝑢𝑃𝑡 =
ˆ 𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝑑𝑡 + ˆ 𝑑𝑡










𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝑑𝑡 + ˆ 𝑑𝑡
(1 − 𝗼𝑡)𝑉.
A principal of type 𝑠 maximizes
𝑢𝑃𝑠 =
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 1)𝑑𝑡




𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 1)𝑑𝑡
(1 − 𝗼𝑡)𝑉.
Notice that a delegate of a principal of type 𝑠 is concerned with maximizing
𝜋𝐷𝑠 =
𝑑𝑠
𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 1)𝑑𝑡
(1 − 𝗼𝑠)𝑉 − 𝑑𝑠.
While an agent of a 𝑡 typed principal maximizes
𝜋𝐷𝑡 =
ˆ 𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝑑𝑠 + ˆ 𝑑𝑡
(1 − ˆ 𝗼𝑡)𝑉 − ˆ 𝑑𝑡.
Using the ﬁrst order conditions to compute the winning probabilities, we obtain
𝑝𝑠 =
(𝑛 − 1)𝗼𝑠 − (𝑛 − 2)𝗼𝑡




𝗼𝑡 +( 𝑛 − 1)𝗼𝑠
.
The problem of player 𝑠 becomes
𝜋𝑃𝑠 =
(𝑛 − 1)𝗼𝑠 − (𝑛 − 2)𝗼𝑡 − (𝑛 − 1)𝗼2
𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝗼𝑠𝗼𝑡






𝗼𝑡 +( 𝑛 − 1)𝗼𝑠
𝑉
28Looking for a symmetric equilibrium, we can insert 𝗼𝑠 = 𝗼𝑡 = 𝗼 into the ﬁrst order
condition. The optimal 𝗼 is then given by
𝗼 =
(𝑛 − 1)2𝑁
𝑁(𝑛2 − 𝑛 +1 )− 𝑛
.
Hence we obtain, each principal has an utility of
𝑢𝑃 =
𝑛(𝑁 − 𝑛)
𝑛𝑁(𝑛2 − 𝑛 +1 )− 𝑛2𝑉
and an absolute payoﬀ of
𝜋𝑃 =
𝑛(𝑁 − 1)
𝑛𝑁(𝑛2 − 𝑛 +1 )− 𝑛
𝑉.
A delegate of any player in the contest will receive
𝜋𝐷 =
(𝑛 − 1)2𝑁







𝑁(𝑛2 − 𝑛 +1 )− 𝑛
𝑉.
It is straightforward to show that this is positive. Therefore it is ensured that the partic-
ipation constraint of the agent is met.
6.1.2 Relative contracts
An agent is paid according to her success relative to the mean of all other agents, that is




𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 1)𝑑𝑡
)
𝑉 + 𝐹𝑠 − 𝑑𝑠.
Ad e l e g a t eo fap l a y e ro ft y p e𝑡 maximizes
𝜋𝐷𝑡 = ˆ 𝗽𝑡
(
ˆ 𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝑑𝑡 + ˆ 𝑑𝑡
−
𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝑑𝑡
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑑𝑠 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝑑𝑡 + ˆ 𝑑𝑡)
)
𝑉 + 𝐹𝑡 − ˆ 𝑑𝑡.
29By deriving the ﬁrst order conditions and setting them equal, we get the following rela-




(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 − (𝑛 − 2)𝗽𝑡.
This yields the winning probabilities
𝑝𝑠 =
(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 − (𝑛 − 2)𝗽𝑡




(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 + 𝗽𝑡
.
Principal 𝑠 than maximizes
𝜋𝑃𝑠 =
(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 − (𝑛 − 2)𝗽𝑡
(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 + 𝗽𝑡
− 𝗽𝑠
(
(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 − (𝑛 − 2)𝗽𝑡
(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 + 𝗽𝑡
−
𝗽𝑡














(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 + 𝗽𝑡
−
(𝑛 − 1)𝗽𝑠 − (𝑛 − 2)𝗽𝑡 +( 𝑛 − 2)𝗽𝑡
















As stated above this is the same result as if independent payoﬀ maximizing players would
play the contest without delegation.
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